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1 Introduction
Who benefits from the process of economic growth? Do low income people (or
poor) benefit as much as rich people? Do capitalists gain more than workers?
These issues of size and functional distribution of income is discussed widely in
the literature on distribution of income (Picketty (2014), Jenkins (1995), Atkinson
(1970), Kuznet (1955)). Share of labour income has gradually declined in the global
economy (Figure 1) and as discussed in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). Bach-
man et al. (2016) apply a dynamic CGE model of the US economy to investigate
how tax and transfer system affects the distribution of income in the US economy
under Trump and Cruz tax-transfer scenarios and find the share of labour income
not only depends on tax and transfer system but also on the substitutability of
capital and labour in production.
Figure 1: Share of labour income in the global economy
Gini coefficient an indicator of the inequality of income. Its value range be-
tween zero and one; zero for perfect equality and one for perfect inequality. In
majority of countries in the Western Europe it has increased from around 0.29 in
1960 to 0.39 in recent years mainly because of declining share of labour. OECD
(2015) provides a time series evidence on growing inequality among the OECD
and emerging economies and its adverse impacts on economic growth (Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Gini coefficients among the OECD and emerging economies (OECD)
Should there be more redistribution or more growth? It is obvious that no one
solution fits to all circumstances. Institutions and culture vary by countries as do
the endowments of labour and capital as well as of the natural resources. Policies
should be designed according to economic and social institutions of a country (see
debates in the World Economic Forum in Davos, http://www.weforum.org/).
See Penn World Tables for the dataset at:
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table. Picketty suggests
global tax on property to reduce such inequality. This idea is close to socialists’
approach to income distribution. Capitalists would argue for more equality by
raising productivity of workers through additional accumulation of physical cap-
ital, development of human capital by investing in education and skills. They
favour taxes on consumption rather than in income, indirect tax than the direct
tax.
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Figure 3: Rising Gini coefficients among the OECD countries (OECD)
Objective of this paper is to provide a general overview of these theories with
recent evidences on the share of labour in income and to show how these theo-
ries enhance our understanding on the role of income distribution in production,
consumption and social welfare in an economy.
2 Theories on share of labour in total income
The shares of capital and labour in national income vary considerably both over
time and across countries. Picketty (2014) has formed dataset on income distri-
bution between capital and labour for last 200 years for the advanced countries
of Europe as well as the US (see http://topincomes.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/).
He found that trade openness and technological innovation have a positive and
significant effect on labour shares. Similarly foreign direct investments (FDI) in-
flows and mechanization seem to be negative drivers in it . He also looks into a
number of variables including the level of economic development, education, and
the strength of the regulations in the labour market.
Share of labour in income was an important issue in the functional distrib-
ution of income. It was widely discussed by classical and neoclassical econo-
mists, Marx, Kaldor, Hansen, Hahn, Hicks in terms of marginal productivity
theory of distribution. Factors are paid according their marginal productivity in
their theories. Recently there are new theories of bargaining of income and wages
(Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)). Bhattarai, Haughton and Tuerck (2015a, 2015b)
find significant impact of fair taxes and corporate income taxes on growth and
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distribution of income in the US economy.
It was believed that the share of labour was relatively constant, between 60
to 70 percents of GDP up to 1980s (Parente and Prescott (2002)). However many
recent studies find that there is a general pattern of reduction in the share of GDP
going to labour around the world, in particular from the mid-1980s onwards as
shown in Figure 1 above. Seminal works on labour share are include Hicks (1932),
Kuznet (1955), Kennedy (1964), Hahn (1972), Cowling, Molho and Oswald (1981),
Lavoie and Stockhammer (2014), O’Mahony and Timmer (2009), Stockhammer,
Onaran and Ederer (2009), Stockhammer and Onaran ( 2004) and Elsby, Hobijn,
S¸ahin (2013) and Picketty (2014). What is the optimal amount labour share (1  α)
that maximises the economic growth? This issue is yet far from settled. A sort
summary on important theories is provided here for a concise understanding of
these topics.
2.1 Neoclassical theory of functional distribution of income
The neoclassical theory of functional distribution can simply be represented in a
employment-wage diagram. Market sets the wage rate (w) where the demand for
labour intersects to the supply of labour. Area of rectangle represents wage bill.
The area below the demand curve is part of production that goes to employers as
profit.
Figure 3: Wage and profit in the neoclassical distribution model
Marginal productivity declines with more employment due to the law of di-
minishing returns to labour. Upward sloping labour supply function represents
psychological and other costs as working more hours becomes more difficult.
Workers are ready to put in more efforts only if they are paid more. The equilib-
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rium point shown by the intersection between the demand and supply of labour
also shows the functional distribution of income in wages and profits. It is ob-
vious when profits are high when wages are low. There are always incentives
among owners to pay low wage in order to minimise cost and to raise their prof-
its. Given the α and β shares of capital and labour in total output (Y), division
of national income between capital (rK) and labour (wL) occurs according to the
marginal productivity of these inputs as shown in following equations:
Y
A
= KαLβ =) Y = AKαLβ (1)
Y = rK+ wL =) rK
Y
+
wL
Y
= 1 (2)
rK
Y
+
wL
Y
=
αAKα 1LβK
AKαLβ
+
βAKαLβ 1L
AKαLβ
= (α+ β) = 1 (3)
Technology of production is characterised by the elasticity of substitution (σ)
between labour and capital that measures the degree of response of capital labour
ratio to the wage rental ratios. In a simple Cobb-Douglas function this elasticity
of substitution is 1.
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A CES production function allows other values of σ , a higher value of σ
represents more capital intensive technology and a lower value of σ indicates
more labour intensive technology. Productivity of labour rises with more capi-
tal, whether wage rate rises depends on how the distribution of income occurs
between capital and labour. Thus rising income inequality among the global econ-
omy reflects more capital intensity production and more return to capital than to
the labour. Increase in human capital through education can enhance the labour
share and more investment in education and skills is important in raising the
value of β, share of labour in the national income.
2.2 Marxian theory the surplus value (S)
The notion of surplus value (S) is a key concept in the Marxian theory. This theory
attributes that all value is created by labour. Only labour generates value. Capital
is made by labour in the past. The capitalists own the capital and they pay only
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the subsistence wage to the labour. Each unit of labour creates more output than
requires for its subsistence but the surplus value, the gap between the output and
wage. goes to capitalists who own the firm and employ the labour. In other words
the surplus value (S) per unit of output represents the amount by which price (P)
of a commodity is above the wage (W):
S = P W
Wage share in output is denoted simply by the ratio wage to the price (WP ) is
the output minus the the share of the surplus value s = SP . Thus:
W
P
= (1  s); s = S
P
Capitalists squeeze on wages by increasing the surplus value ratio (s); more
strictly following the iron law of wage. More is the surplus value less is paid
to the labour. More unequal becomes the income distribution. Labour produces
more than the iron wage requited for its subsistence but the capitalists do not pay
more that what is necessary for survival. Development of economies in advanced
economies avoided class between capitalists and workers by adopting more egal-
itarian social security system funded by the tax-transfer system and provision
for pensions and tax credits to low income groups in the last century, particu-
larly after the World War II. Waves privatisation and deregulation since mid 1980s
have gradually caused increases in the surplus value and reductions in the share
of labour. This has resulted in significant increase in inequality in each country
among the OECD and other economies as shown in Figure 1 - 3 above.
2.3 Kaldorian theory of functional distribution
In Kaldorian theory of functional distribution, the share of labour is a function of
saving rates of workers (sw) and capitalists (sp) and investment ratios ( IY ). Let the
output (Y) be total of wage (W) and profits (P):
Y =W + P;
W
Y
= 1  P
Y
(5)
Investment (I) equals saving (S). Saving occurs from profits and wages as:
I = S and S = Sp + Sw Sp = spP and Sw = swW; sp > sw (6)
It is assumed that owners of firms save more than workers, sp > sw:
I = spP+ swW = spP+ sw (Y  P) =
 
sp   sw

P+ swY (7)
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Profit increases by more investment but decreases by more saving by workers.
The share of labour in this model increases when saving from profit increases
relative to that from wage and reduced by higher rate of investment.
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Wage share can increase if the capitalists save more than workers but reduces
if they invest more. Why investment reduces labour share is counter intuitive.
2.4 Hahn’s Dynamic Theory of Wage Share
Hahn (1972) adopts Hicks’ dynamic theory of wage share. He shows interde-
pendence between the wage share and the marginal propensity to consume. The
interaction between supply and demand factors in the economy. By acceleration
principle change in output at time period t, (∆Yt) responds to the level of invest-
ment in t  1 period as:
∆Yt = αIt 1
Here α is the measure of acceleration effect of investment in income. Level
of investment (It) on the other hand is responds to lagged change in demand,
(Yt 1  Yt 2):
It = ν (Yt 1  Yt 2) = ν∆Yt 1 (9)
These two are combined into a second order difference equation:
∆Yt = αν∆Yt 2 (10)
This equation has two roots λ1 and λ2. Let ∆Yt = λtAt
∆Yt   αν∆Yt 2 = λtA1   ανλt 2A2 = 0 =) λ2   αν = 0 (11)
λ1 =
p
αν and λ2 =  
p
αν. The transitional path of income can be found as:
∆Yt = λ1A1 + λ2A2; ∆Yt = λ1A1 * A2 = 0 (12)
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Let the demand consist of consumption (cYt 1) and investment (ν
 
Ydt 1  Ydt 2

),
with c propensity to consume and v as coefficient for investment demand:
Ydt = cYt 1 + ν

Ydt 1  Ydt 2

(13)
In equilibrium demand and supply equal:
Yt = cYt 1 + ν (Yt 1  Yt 2) (14)
Take the one period difference:
Yt  Yt 1 = ∆Yt = c∆Yt 1 + ν (∆Yt 1   ∆Yt 2) (15)
Yt = γt1R1 + γ
t 2
2 R2; ∆Yt = γ
t
1R1 * R2 = 0 (16)
Dynamic condition for equilibrium between demand and supply implies λ1 =
γ1 Then
 ν+
s
(αν+ v)2
αν
= c
Let marginal propensity to consume (c) relates to wage share

W
Y

as:
c = z
W
Y
+ k
Then wage share also depends on the marginal propensity to consume:
W
Y
=
1
z
[c  k] = 1
z
24 ν+
s
(αν+ v)2
αν
  k
35
Proof of wage share:
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p
αν = γ1 =
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p
(c+v)2 4v
2 =)

2
p
αν  (c+ v)2  (c+ v)2+ 4v =
0
4αν  4pαν(c+ v) + (c+ v)2   (c+ v)2 + 4v = 0 =) αν+ v = pαν(c+ v)
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αν
Thus there is interdependence between the wage share and the marginal propen-
sity to consume (c) as well as the supply factors as captured by the acceleration
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coefficient (α, ν) in the economy. This theory implies the increase in inequality
among the OECD economies are due to the cyclical factors of demand and supply
among OECD economies.
2.5 Labour Market and Search and Matching Model
Producers use labour to produce goods and services. A production function shows
how labour complements with other inputs in production and the marginal pro-
ductivity of labour shows the additional unit of output produced by each addi-
tional unit of labour. Thus demand for labour is derived from the demand for
output. On the supply side every working age person has 168 hours a week, 720
hours per months or 8760 hours per year of time endowment which can be allo-
cated between work and leisure. How many hours does one work and how much
is spent in free time really depends upon the preference between consumption
and leisure on one hand and the job vacancies on the other. In theory, flexibility
of real wages guarantees equality between demand and supply in the labour in
a competitive labour market. However, the labour market is far from a perfectly
competitive market. Firms exercise monopoly powers, acting as monopsonists
in the labour market or use their market power in order to retain more effective
workers. Hiring decisions of firms also are dependent on the aggregate demand.
Firms hire more workers during expansion but are reluctant of recruit any work-
ers during the contraction. A significant number of workers become unemployed
as a consequence.
Given a production function that related output (Yt) to capital (Kt), technology
(At) and labour (Lt)
Yt = Kαt (AtLt)
1 α 0 < α < 1 (17)
Wage rate should be paid according to the marginal productivity of labour as:
wt = (1  α)Kαt (AtLt) α At (18)
Supply of labour occurs through the utility maximising behavior of the house-
hold.
max
∞
∑
t=0
βtU (ct, 1  lt) (19)
subject to
ct + kt+1 = wtlt + (1+ rt) kt (20)
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This results in labour supply to be:
Lt   Lt = Lt   (1  α)
(1  α) + (1  αβ) b (21)
Income patterns over time are different for different individuals. Some people
start at a very low level of earnings and experience a rapid rise in income as they
gain more job specific experience. Others may have a steady and stagnant income
process over years. Still others may even have to face declining growth in income.
What are the factors that lead to higher income growth rates and what are the fac-
tors that setback the process of income growth has been an issue of great interest
among the labour economists.
The years of schooling and job market experience are the most important fac-
tors associated with higher income levels. Given other things constant, generally
it is believed that an individual with greater number of schooling years earns more
than a person with a few years or no schooling. Similarly a person with greater
experience earns higher income. Both schooling and experience are perceived to
be the main factors enhancing productivity of an individual.
There are a number of factors that set back the income process. Gender bias has
been an area of continuous research in the labour economics. Females earn less
than male either because of a structural breaks in their career for family reasons
or due to gender discrimination in the labour market. Similarly there are cross
regional variation in the income process.
As discussed in Pissarides (2013) and in Bhattarai and Dixon (2014) "the phe-
nomenon of equilibrium unemployment results from the interaction among N
number of firms and unions (representing H number of households) which bar-
gain over wages and employment".
Matching and bargaining functions across all N industries are key elements de-
termining equilibrium unemployment . The Matching function (Beveridge curve)
gives equilibrium conditions in the labour market balancing entry and exit from
unemployment by aggregating sector and skill specific vacancies

Vhi,t

and un-
employment

UNhi,t

with job creation as:
Mt = M (Vt,UNt) = V
γt
t UN
(1 γt)
t (22)
where Mt, Vt and UNt denote the aggregate number of matching, vacancies and
unemployment respectively among job seekers at time t and aggregate variables
11
are geometric means of household level variables1. The matching parameter γt
is between zero and one and varies over time. It can be adjusted for prosper-
ous period when there are more vacancies than job seekers or in recession when
there are more unemployed than vacancies. In steady state it should be about
0.5 to reflect the balance between job creation and job destruction. Heterogeneity
in the labour market is reflected by sector and skill specific Mhi,t, V
h
i,t and UN
h
i,t.
These capture the labour market conditions where production sectors suffer from
shortages of certain skills while facing abundance of other skills. In each case job
seekers and employers bargain over expected earnings by maximising the Nash-
product

NPhi,t

of the bargaining game over the difference between the earnings
from work (Whi,t) than in being unemployed (UN
h
i,t) and earnings to firms from
filled

Jhi,t

and vacant jobs

Vhi,t

.
NPhi,t =

Whi,t  UNhi,t
θhb Jhi,t  Vhi,t1 θhb (23)
Market imperfections in the labour market create opportunity of gains from bar-
gains which is divided between firms and workers as indicated by parameter θhb
that can assume any value between zero and one, reflecting the relative strength of
unions (workers) over firms in such bargains. Symmetric solution of this satisfies
joint profit maximisation condition as:
Whi,t  UNhi,t

= θhb

Jhi,t +W
h
i,t  Vhi,t  UNhi,t

(24)
In aggregate the job search model can be explained using three simple equa-
tions as summarised by Pissarides (1979, 2000).
First, for each skill type h the dynamics of unemployment depends on the rate
of job destruction, λht
 
1  unht

, and the rate of job creation, θht q

θht

unht as ∆un
h
t
= λht
 
1  unht
  θht q θht  unht . The steady state equilibrium implied by this is:
unht =
λht
λht + θ
h
t q

θht
 ; unT = λT
λT + θTq (θT)
(25)
where λht is the rate of idiosyncratic shock of job destruction of household type h
and θht is the ratio of vacancy to the unemployment and q

θht

is the probability
1Vt =
N
Π
i=1
Vhi,t;UNt =
N
Π
i=1
UNhi,t; Mt =
N
Π
i=1
Mhi,t =
N
Π
i=1
M

Vhi,t,UN
h
i,t

.
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of filling a job with a suitable candidate through the matching process explained
in (22). Then unT is the equilibrium unemployment rate average across all house-
holds expressed in terms of averages of λht θ
h
t and q (θT) given by λT, θT and q (θT)
respectively.
Secondly the upward sloping wage curve in (θht ,wht ) space shows positive links
between the reservation wage (zht ) the price of product p and cost of hiring (θ
h
t cht )
implying higher wage rates for tighter labour markets as:
whi,t = z
h
t

1  θhb

+ θhb pt

1+ θht c
h
t

(26)
Finally there is a downward sloping job creation curve wht = pt 

rt + λht

ptcht
q(θht )
,
where pt is the price of product, wht the wage rate, and

rt + λht
 ptcht
q(θht )
, is the cost
of hiring and firing. It shows the possibility of job creation at lower wage rates
and creation of fewer jobs at higher wage rates. The optimal job creation (de-
mand for labour curve) occurs when firms balance the marginal revenue product
of labour to wage and hiring and firing costs (see some details in Bhattarai and
Dixon (2014)).Following the market signals of demand and relative prices and
costs of inputs, profit maximising firms create vacancies for specific tasks and hire
workers when they find suitable candidates for these jobs. Similarly there are
workers seeking jobs that match their skills and others who quit jobs and join the
pool of unemployed who may choose to quit jobs and become unemployed. Mar-
ket specific idiosyncratic shocks cause such entries and exits in the labour market.
Equilibrium unemployment and wage rates result from a Nash-bargain between
workers and firms. Whether the rate of unemployment falls or rises depends on
the relative proportion of entry and exit into the labour market.
2.6 Human capital theory of income share
Recently authors economists Becker, Mincer, Lucas, Aghion, Helpman, Jones, Weale,
Temple and Blanchard have emphasized on the human capital theory of income
distribution. Education provides skills and make people more productive. Higher
productivity translates into higher wage rates. Individuals who invest more on
education and skills earn more than others who have not invested in them. This
can be illustrated with a simple model of life time income (LI) with and without
university education as given below:
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LI=
h
1+ (1+ g) + (1+ g)2 + ....+ (1+ g)n
i
Y0
=Y0
"
1  (1+ g)n+1
1  (1+ g)
#
(27)
Life time income with university education
LI=Y0
"
1  (1+ g)n+1
1  (1+ g)
#
  3 C
= 30000
"
1  (1.04)42+1
1  (1.04)
#
  3 15000 = 3, 255, 371 (28)
Life time income without university education
Y0
"
1  (1+ g)n+1
1  (1+ g)
#
= 17000
"
1  (1.02)45+1
1  (1.02)
#
= 1, 263, 620 (29)
Extra life time income comes from the university education. Difference in in-
come made the university level education in the life time of an individual thus is
the difference between these two levels of income; £3,255,371-£1,263,620=£1,991,751.
Thus university education makes one better off by nearly 2 million pounds. Stud-
ies of Jenkins (1995, 1996) illustrate on such differences. Econometrically these
studies estimate a standard earning function from the labour market dataset such
as the Annual Population Survey (APS). In Mincerian tradition earnings depend
on qualifications and status of health and many other conditions as shown in a
regression table below.
wi,t = ai + βiSi,t + γiAi,t + ψiA
2
i,t + λiGi,t + δiRi,t + piiPi,tpi + θt∆t + εi,t
where wi,t is the wage rate of individual i in year t; Si,t is years of schooling; Ai,t
is age of individual i in time t; Gi,t is the gender of an individual, Ri,t is regional
location, ∆t is wave t, Pi,t is professional background of individual i. Coefficients
of such earning functions are estimated using cross section or panel dataset.
Bargaining between unions of workers and firms also is important as taxes on
income and consumption and unemployment benefits (see Mirrlees et al. (2010)
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Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  368525
-------------+------------------------------ F( 17,368507) =    8.76
Model |   139225393    17  8189728.98           Prob > F      =  0.0000
Residual |  3.4450e+11368507  934864.212           R-squared     =  0.0004
-------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared =  0.0004
Total |  3.4464e+11368524  935198.879           Root MSE      =  966.88
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRSEXP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
ILLDAYS2 |   .5135184   3.158899     0.16   0.871 -5.67783    6.704866
ILLDAYS1 |   2.180592   2.085396     1.05   0.296 -1.906723    6.267907
ILLDAYS3 | -4.435447   3.853808 -1.15   0.250 -11.9888    3.117903
ILLDAYS4 |   8.066717   4.485219     1.80   0.072 -.7241797    16.85761
ILLDAYS5 | -5.238917   3.738412 -1.40   0.161 -12.56609     2.08826
ILLDAYS6 | -1.988442   6.544168 -0.30   0.761 -14.81482    10.83793
ILLDAYS7 | -.1315924   8.270102 -0.02   0.987 -16.34075    16.07756
QUAL_14 |   4.705906   5.354454     0.88   0.379 -5.788664    15.20048
QUAL_15 | -6.997297   16.48718 -0.42   0.671 -39.31169     25.3171
QUAL_16 | -12.89791   11.85998 -1.09   0.277 -36.14313     10.3473
QUAL_17 |   97.47657   34.51317     2.82   0.005     29.83178    165.1214
QUAL_18 | -13.84225   32.57728 -0.42   0.671 -77.69276    50.00826
QUAL_19 |   3.716753   4.476542     0.83   0.406 -5.057138    12.49064
QUAL_2 |   13.91868   12.39392     1.12   0.261 -10.37304     38.2104
QUAL_20 |    32.4236   7.656584     4.23   0.000     17.41692 47.43028
QUAL_21 |     43.351   4.285564    10.12   0.000     34.95142    51.75058
QUAL_22 | -1.453274   6.644386 -0.22   0.827 -14.47607    11.56953
_cons | -5.248379   52.42735 -0.10   0.920 -108.0044    97.50769
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
or the Green Budgets from the IFS for the UK for more extensive analysis on these
issues).
Thinks of millions of workers in the economy. They work for earnings; in
Mincerian traditions earnings depend on qualifications and status of health and
many other conditions as shown in a regression table below.
wi,t = ai + βiSi,t + γiAi,t + ψiA
2
i,t + λiGi,t + δiRi,t + piiPi,tpi + θt∆t + εi,t
where wi,t is the wage rate of individual i in year t; Si,t is years of schooling; Ai,t
is age of individual i in time t; Gi,t is the gender of an individual, Ri,t is regional
location, ∆t is wave t, Pi,t is professional background of individual i. Coefficients
of such earning functions are estimated using cross section or panel dataset. For
instance using the cross section of the APS:
In addition to above variable earning differ by location of the labour markets.
Local, regional, national, urban, rural, global labour markets function differently.
Earning also vary by professions. Teachers, lawyers, doctors, engineers, scientists,
artists have different levels of earning. Skilled workers are paid more than un-
skilled or semi-skilled workers. Labour market institutions mater. Job prospects
are less in the rigid and opaque labor markets than in flexible and transparent
labour markets. Labour earning also vary by the term of employment. Earnings
are less in short term compared to medium term and long term employments.
There are professions where labour supply occurs in inter-generational setting.
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2.7 Two sector model of necessity and luxury goods (income dis-
tribution)
Let us assume that workers and capitalists dwell in an economy. Workers con-
sume only necessities and capitalists consume necessities and luxury goods. Work-
ers supply all labour and but capitalists do not work. Total endowment of labour
supply is 50 and wage rates are same across necessity and luxury sectors.
LS = 50; w1 = w2 = w (30)
Production function of sector i is
Qi = AiK
αi
i L
1 αi
i (31)
For simplicity assume that capital share (αi) is 50 percent in both sectors. en-
dowment of capital is 100 for the necessity sector and 144 for the luxury sector.
Technology Ai = 1 in both sectors.
Table 1: Parameters in production of the two sector model
α K A
Necessity sector 0.5 100 1
Luxury sector 0.5 144 1
Worker spend all of their income in necessity goods and capitalists. Capitalists
save 20 percent of their income and spend on investment. Of the remaining 80
percent, spend 20 percent is spent on necessities and 60 percent on luxury goods.
Table 2: Parameters in consumption of the two sector model
θ1 θ2 θ3
Workers 1 0 0
Capitalist 0.2 0.6 0.2
pi1 = P1Q1   wL1   rK1 = P1A1Kα11 L1 α11   wL1   rK1 (32)
∂pi
∂L1
= (1  α1) A1Kα11 L α11 = P1  0.5 1000.5  L 0.5   w = 0 (33)
Thus labour demand in necessity goods sector
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L0.51 =
5P1
w
; L1 = 25

P1
w
2
(34)
Supply of necessity goods
Q1 = A1Kα11 L
1 α1
1 = 10L
0.5
1 = 10
(
25

P1
w
2)0.5
; Q1 = 50
P1
w
(35)
Demand for labour and supply function in the luxury goods sector
pi = P2Q2   wL2   rK2 = P2A2Kα22 L1 α22   wL2   rK2 (36)
∂pi
∂L2
= (1  α2) A2Kα22 L α22 = P2  0.5 1440.5  L 0.5   w = 0 (37)
Thus labour demand in luxury goods sector
L0.52 =
6P2
w
; L2 =

6P2
w
2
= 36

P2
w
2
(38)
Supply of luxury goods
Q2 = A2Kα22 L
2 α2
2 = 12L
0.5
2 = 12
(
36

P2
w
2)0.5
; Q2 = 72
P2
w
(39)
Income of workers come from wages in necessity and luxury goods sectors as:
YL = wL1 + wL2 = 50w (40)
Income of capitalists (from the production function capitalist get the same as
the labour)
YK = YL = 50w (41)
Demand for necessities and luxury goods
P1Qd1 = YL + 0.2YK = 50w+ 0.2 (50w) = 60w (42)
Qd1 = 60
w
P1
(43)
Demand for luxury goods
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P2Qd2 = 0.6YK + I = 0.6 (50w) + 0.2 (50w) = 40w (44)
Qd2 = 40
w
P2
(45)
Market clearing conditions in goods and labour markets
Q1 = 50
P1
w
= Qd1 = 60
w
P1
(46)
Q2 = 72
P2
w
= Qd2 = 40
w
P2
(47)
L1 + L2 = LS = 25

P1
w
2
+ 36

P2
w
2
= LS = 50 (48)
I = S (49)
Walras’ Law: sum of excess demand is zero; when two markets clear third
market automatically clears.
Let the necessity goods be a numeraire, P1 = 1.From necessity goods market:
50
P1
w
= 60
w
P1
=) 5 1
w
= 6
w
1
=) w2 = 5
6
=) w = 0.913 (50)
From luxury goods market:
72
P2
w
= 40
w
P2
=) P22 =
5
9
w2 =
5
9
 5
6
=
25
54
= 0.463 =) P2 = 0.680 (51)
Allocations:
Q1 = 50
1
0.913
= 54.8 = Qd1 = 60
w
P1
= 60 0.913
1
= 54.8 (52)
Q2 = 72
P2
w
= 72 0.680
0.913
= 53.63 = Qd2 = 40
w
P2
= 40 0.913
0.680
= 53.7 (53)
L1 = 25

P1
w
2
= 25

1
0.913
2
= 29.97 (54)
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L2 = 36

P2
w
2
= 36

0.680
0.913
2
= 19.97 (55)
L1 + L2 = 29.97+ 19.9  50 (56)
Table 3: Allocation and distribtion in the two sector model
P Q L W
Necessity sector 1 54.8 29.97 29.97
Luxury sector 0.680 53.7 19.97 19.97
Consumption:
workers’ demand for necessity good
YL = C1,L; 50w = 50 0.913 = 45.65 (57)
Capitalist’s demand for necessity good
0.2YK = C1,K; 0.2 ( 50w) = 0.2 (50 0.913) = 9.13 (58)
Total demand for necessity good
C1,L + C1,K = 45.65+ 9.13  54.8 (59)
workers do not consumer luxury good C2,,L = 0;
Table 4: Parameters in consumption of the two sector model
C1 C2 I2
Workers 45.65 0 0
Capitalist 9.13 40.23 13.43
Capitalist’s demand for luxury good
C2,K =
0.6YK
P2
=
27.39
0.681
= 40.23 (60)
Investment demand by capitalist for luxury good
I
P2
=
0.2 (50 0.913)
P2
=
9.13
0.680
= 13.43 (61)
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Market clearing for the luxury goods market:
C2,,K + I = 40.23+ 13.43 = 53.7 (62)
It is possible to increase the amount available to workers by altering the pro-
portions saved and invested and by changing the consumption structure or en-
dowments of capital and labour in this economy. This simple example illustrates
that distribution should not be looked into in isolation to the consumption, pro-
duction and investment and tax and spending activities of the economy but si-
multaneously. A multi-household multisectoral general equilibrium model is a
tool to achieve this objective. One illustration is provided below where the factors
or production are owned by both households engaging on producing two goods
which both of them consume.
3 A simple computable general equilibrium model with labour
leisure choice
Consider an economy with two individuals, i = 1, 2 and two commodities x
(goods) and y (services). Both households are endowed with given amount of
capital stock

k1, k2

and time
 
L1, L2

, which they spend either working or in
the form of leisure. Households and firms optimize taking prices of commodi-
ties
 
px, py

and factors (pL, pk) as given. Competition between suppliers and
consumers or producers sets the equilibrium price of commodities and income of
households (I1, I2) More specifically the problems of households and firms can
be stated as:
Household’s problem:
max U1 = x
a1
1 y
b1
1
 _
L1   LS1
g1
; a1 > 0, b1 > 0, g1 > 0. (63)
subject to:
I1 = pxx1 + pyy1 + pL
 _
L1   LS1

; I1 = pL
_
L1 + pk
_
K1 (64)
x1  0, y1  0,
 _
L1   LS1

 0.
max U2 = x
a2
2 y
b2
2
 _
L2   LS2
g2
; a2 > 0, b2 > 0, g2 > 0. (65)
subject to:
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I2 = pxx2 + pyy2 + pL
 _
L2   LS2

; I2 = pL
_
L2 + pk
_
K2 (66)
x2  0, y2  0,
 _
L2   LS2

 0.
Firm’s problem:
max pix = pxx  pkkx   pLLS1x   pLLS2x (67)
subject to:
x = kθxx LS1
θ1x
x LS2
θ2x
x (68)
max piy = pyy  pkky   pLLS1y   pLLS2y (69)
subject to:
y = kθyy LS1
θ1y
y LS2
θ2y
y (70)
Equilibrium conditions:
x = x1 + x2 (71)
y = y1 + y2 (72)
kx + ky = k1 + k2 (73)
L1 + LS1x + LS1y =
_
L1; LS1 = LS1x + LS1y (74)
L2 + LS2x + LS2y =
_
L2...LS2 = LS2x + LS2y (75)
Price normalisation:
px + py + pL + pk = 1 (76)
Questions that arise here are what are the demand for x and y and leisure (or
labour supply) by households 1 and 2 i. e. determine x1, x2, y1, y2, LS1, LS2. How
should we determine the demand for labour and capital by firms supplying x
and y, i,e, evaluate kx, ky, LS1x, LS1y, LS2x, LS2y. How can we compute the equi-
librium relative price system for this economy that are consistent to optimisation
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problems of households and firms. What are the optimal allocations of resources
in this economy? Given the optimal demand for x and y and leisure by both
households what is the optimal levels of their welfare. Is this Pareto optimal al-
location? How can tax and transfer scheme in this economy in order to improve
the distribution system. How can we apply notions of Hicksian equivalent and
compensating variations in order to evaluate the welfare consequences of tax and
welfare reforms proposed above.
First assign values for behavioral parameters.
Table 5: Parameters for the 2 by 2 model with leisure
a1 a2 b1 b2 g1 g2 θx θy θ1x θ1y
_
L1
_
L1 k1 k2
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 24 24 40 10
Solve this CGE (computable general equilibrium) model. We find solution to
this model using GAMS as presented below:
Table 6: Efficient allocation in the 2 by 2 model with leisure
I1 I2 x1 x2 y1 y2 x y u1 u2
3.42 2.01 5.9 2.8 1.7 1.3 8.7 3.1 4.6 2.4
px py pk pl kx ky L1 L2 ls1 ls2
0.289 0.599 0.047 0.064 35.3 14.7 10.7 6.3 13.3 17.7
ls11 ls12 ls21 ls22
_
L1
_
L2 k1 k2
6.7 8.9 6.7 8.9 24 24 40 10
I1 = pL
_
L1 + pk
_
K1(=0.064*24+0.047*40)=3.42; I2 = pL
_
L2 + pk
_
K2(= 0.064  24+
0.047  10) = 2.01.
Equilibrium conditions are satisfied in both goods and factor markets:
x = x1 + x2 = 5.9+ 2.8 = 8.7 (77)
y = y1 + y2 = 1.7+ 1.3 = 3.1 (78)
kx + ky = 35.3+ 14.7 = k1 + k2 = 44+ 10 = 50 (79)
L1 + LS1x + LS1y = 10.7+ 6.7+ 6.7 = 24 =
_
L1; LS1 = LS1x + LS1y (80)
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L2 + LS2x + LS2y = 6.3+ 8.9+ 8.9 = 24 =
_
L2...LS2 = LS2x + LS2y (81)
Alternative scenarios of this model could be found for varies rates of VAT in
commodities x and y or for different rates of taxes in labour and capital inputs.
Also these scenarios could be computed with a revenue target and do equal yield
tax reforms finding model solution when all taxes or only a labour income tax or
the capital income tax are changed. The it is also possible to compute the optimal
tax rates that maximise revenue (hint make tax rates endogenous and solve the
maximisation routine). Thus a general equilibrium model like this is appropriate
to study both the functional and size distribution of income.
3.1 Global Empirical Evidence on Declining Labour Share
We construct panel data set for 127 countries for year 1990 to 2011 for labour in-
come share (labshare), consumption share (consshare), capital share (capshare),
government consumption share (Govconshare), import share (impshare), exports
share (expshare) and real trade share (Rtrdshare). It is clear that average share of
labour is declining for each decade as shown in Table 7. Labour shae in income
was about 59 percent of GDP and it has declined by 9 pecent point to 51.4 percent
by 2011. The dispersion in these shares have increased as the standard deviation
has reduced from 0.116 to 0.137. Maddison project have more data investigate.
EU KLEMs dataset also provides such information.
Table 7: Average labour share by decades
Years Average share Stand Dev Countries
1950 0.587773529 0.116112995 48
1960 0.570278757 0.128005175 87
1970 0.55353534 0.146336493 107
1980 0.547496719 0.136702051 109
1990 0.548241206 0.138618056 127
2000 0.530072014 0.133766665 127
2011 0.513952814 0.136878886 127
Data source: Penn World Tables v8; Maddison dataset
We estimate the fixed effect and random effect panel data models and results
are reported in Table 8. As is clear the labour share is dealing as the shares of
capital and exports are rising. Increase in private and public consumption, im-
ports have positive and significant impacts. The process of substitution of labour
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by capital as discussed in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Picketty (2014)
have increased the capital share causing reduction in labour share of about ten
percent magnitude.
Table 8: Static Panel Regression Estimates for the OECD countries (1990:1-2014:4)
Dep Variable: labour share Fixed Effect Random Effect
Consumption share 0.559*** 0.548***
Capital share -0.004*** -0.104***
Gov cons share 0.088*** 0.088***
Import share 0.034*** 0.033***
Exports share -0.033*** -0.033***
Real Trade share 0 0
Constant 0.520*** 0.520***
Tests F(1, 2270) = 58.21(0.000) Wald: χ2 (2) = 290.7 (0.000)
Sample N =127; NT= 2794 N =127; NT= 2794
Within 0.0986 0.0986
Between 0.0160 0.0160
Overall 0.0218 0.0218
Hausman Test for random effect model χ2 (2) = 24.46 (0.000)
3.2 Social Welfare Function
Distribution of income can be a result of the social choice. If the policy makers as-
sign different weights to utility of different types of individuals in the economy it
results in patter of income distribution that is different when policy makers tread
every individuals equally. In general it is good to reward more productive work-
ers than to lazier one. For instance, consider an economy that is inhabited by type
1 and type 2 people. The type 1 is more productive than the type 2. Policy makers
encourage productive people by assigning a greater weight to the utility of more
productive people. Let us assume that they want to maximise the social welfare
function: W = U
3
4
1 U
1
4
2 where W is the index of the social welfare, U1 represents
the utility of type 1 people and U2 is the utility of type 2 people. Utility of more
productive type is three times worth more than less productive ones. For simplic-
ity assume that resources of this economy produce a given level of output Y. It
is consumed either by 1 or by 2 type people. Market clearing condition implies:
Y = Y1 + Y2 . If the preferences for type 1 are given by U1 =
p
Y1and for type 2
by U2 =
p
Y2 and the total output, Y, is 1000 billion pounds. Four scenarios are
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considered and the optimal allocations and social welfare are presented in Tables
below.
Table 9: Parameters in consumption of the two sector model
Output (Y) and weight Y=1000; α1 = 34 ; α2 =
1
4 ; Economy 1
Income Utility U. function:
p
Yi
Type 1 individuals 750
p
750 = 27.4
p
Y1 =
p
750 = 27.4
Type 2 individuals 250
p
250 = 15.8
p
Y2 =
p
250 = 15.8
Social Welfare W = (U1)
3
4 (U2)
1
4 = 27.4
3
4  15.8 14 = 23.9
Y=1000; α1 = 12 ; α2 =
1
2 ; Economy 2
Type 1 individuals 500
p
500 = 22.4
p
Y1 =
p
500 = 22.4
Type 2 individuals 500
p
500 = 22.4
p
Y2 =
p
500 = 12.8
Social Welfare W = (U1)
1
2 (U2)
1
2 = 22.4
1
2  22.4 12 = 22.4
Table 10: Parameters in consumption of the two sector model
Output (Y) and weight Y=1000; α1 = 34 ; α2 =
1
4 ; Economy 3 (20 percent tax away)
Income Utility U. function:
p
Yi
Type 1 individuals 600
p
0.8 750 = 24.4 pY1 =
p
600 = 24.4
Type 2 individuals 250
p
0.8 250 = 14.1 pY2 =
p
200 = 14.1
Social Welfare W = (U1)
3
4 (U2)
1
4 = 24.4
3
4  14.4 14 = 21.3
Y=1000; α1 = 34 ; α2 =
1
4 ; Economy 3 (Tax revenue to poor)
Type 1 individuals 600
p
0.8 750 = 24.4 pY1 =
p
600 = 24.4
Type 2 individuals 400
p
400 = 20
p
Y2 =
p
400 = 20
Social Welfare W = (U1)
3
4 (U2)
1
4 = 24.4
3
4  20 14 = 23.2
Let us consider four scenarios of social welfare. It is maximized at 23.9 when
policy makers put weight α1 = 34 ; α2 =
1
4 and there are not taxes. Social wel-
fare index diminishes to 22.2 in economy 2 where policy makers put equal weight
to productive and non-productive workers. Social welfare decreases even fur-
ther to 21.1 if 20 percent tax is imposed and no transfer is returned any of these
households. It slightly improves to 22.4 if all tax revenue is given back to the poor
household. Tax economy is Pareto inferior to the no tax economy. More elaborated
analysis is in Bhattarai, Haughton and Tuerck (2015). This is more comprehensive
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theory of income distribution and welfare that can accommodate wide ranging
concerns relating to social justice and inequality.
4 Conclusions
We review the functional and size theories of income distribution in the context of
growing inequality around the world. The causes for the observed patterns on the
shares of labour and capital income in classical, neoclassical, Marxian, structural-
ists or general equilibrium theories are reviewed. Each of these theory is found
helpful in explaining the inequality of in income observed in the OECD, emerg-
ing and developing economies. Significant empirical evidence exists for declining
labour share as shown by panel data estimation of 127 countries from 1990 to 2011.
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